feat(provenance): FIX-4 — verificador attestation on-chain (cierra V3-C1 + squat)
El verificador attestation queda VIVO: una firma producida por el código REAL de Ergon (arkhe-noesis-core, postcard + mensaje domain-separado) verifica byte-fiel en el pallet Substrate. Cierra el FIX-DEFERRED del roadmap (helper de Ergon ya en árbol) + el replay cross-chain V3-C1. origin-chain-types/attestation_verify.rs (nuevo): - ATTESTATION_DOMAIN_TAG + attestation_signed_message: espejo BYTE-IDÉNTICO del oráculo (DC 076d15cc ASP-3). Mensaje = TAG ‖ genesis_hash(32) ‖ payload. - decode_signing_payload: lector postcard SECUENCIAL total y estricto del SigningPayload de Ergon (sin dep nueva en el runtime wasm frágil). Lectores varint u64/u32 con los bounds exactos de postcard (cierra el LOW de fidelidad flagged: verdict/severity/constraints son u32, máx 5 bytes / 5º ≤ 15). Cotas DoS en strings. NUNCA re-serializa (contrato ASP-3). pallet-origin-provenance: - attest_asset(signing_payload: BoundedVec<u8,512>, signature: [u8;64]): recibe los bytes postcard OPACOS + la firma; decodifica, verifica Ed25519 vía sp_io::crypto::ed25519_verify (host function, no bloatea wasm, precedente FIX-3) sobre el mensaje domain-separado con el genesis_hash de ESTA cadena. La pubkey se decodifica del payload (no param aparte). creator = el validador, anchored_at_block real (cerró los placeholders del scaffold). - Dedup-by-BLAKE3 con rechazo EXPLÍCITO (asset_id = BLAKE3 content hash, dentro del payload firmado → replay del mismo blob reusa el asset_id → AlreadyAttested). Hallazgos de la verificación adversarial (workflow ultracode, 3 lentes) cerrados de RAÍZ: - HIGH asset-id squat / provenance poisoning + MEDIUM tier-forgery: el gate era self-attested (level del payload) → cualquiera con una clave Ed25519 anclaba basura institucional bajo el hash PÚBLICO de un asset legítimo y lo envenenaba de forma inmutable. FIX: registro on-chain AuthorizedValidators (pubkey → nivel OIT) gobernado por Root (register_validator/revoke_validator); la membresía es la VERDAD, no el payload. Mismo patrón que TierProfiles de FIX-6 Stage 2a (legitimidad on-chain, no caller-supplied). Sunset a attestation-driven cuando aterrice el registro OIT de Mathi. - MEDIUM método muerto: removido el ValidationAttestation::signing_payload() SCALE divergente (producía bytes que jamás verificarían — footgun). Decisiones (autoridad Pilar 4): sp_io ed25519_verify (consistente FIX-3, estándar Substrate) · dedup-by-asset_id subsume replay exacto · golden vectors generados desde el oráculo REAL de Ergon (seed [7u8;32], genesis 0xAB) = prueba cross-runtime. PENDIENTE (gap legítimo, no bug): OriginChainAttestationSink (impl del trait ValidationAttestationSink de Ergon) es código cliente off-chain — vive en un crate bridge del monorepo (subxt), NO en el chain repo (dependency direction submódulo→monorepo prohibida). Se cablea con la integración Noesis→chain. Tests: 19 provenance (golden vectors cross-runtime + squat cerrado + revoke + anti-replay cross/intra-chain + tamper + malformed) + 72 types (decoder fuzz- equivalente a postcard + fidelidad u32) + 21 suites workspace verde. cargo +1.88. WASM: build VPS-gated (UnknownOpcode 252 ambiental, ver v0.0.58). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -103,7 +103,14 @@ sp_api::decl_runtime_apis! {
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pub mod pallet {
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use frame_support::pallet_prelude::*;
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use frame_system::pallet_prelude::*;
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use origin_chain_types::{AssetAttestation, AssetHash, ValidationAttestation};
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use frame_support::sp_runtime::traits::{SaturatedConversion, Zero};
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use origin_chain_types::{
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attestation_signed_message, decode_signing_payload, AssetAttestation, AssetHash,
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};
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/// Cota DoS del `signing_payload` postcard recibido (el real ~115 bytes;
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/// 512 es holgado para schema/identifier futuros sin permitir flooding).
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pub type MaxPayloadLen = ConstU32<512>;
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/// Pallet configuration trait canonical.
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///
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@@ -140,6 +147,25 @@ pub mod pallet {
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pub type Attestations<T: Config> =
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StorageMap<_, Blake2_128Concat, AssetHash, AssetAttestation, OptionQuery>;
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/// FIX-4 (cierra el HIGH "asset-id squat"): registro on-chain de validadores
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/// Noesis autorizados → nivel OIT asignado por governance. **La membresía es
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/// la VERDAD**, no el `level` que el firmante pone en su propio payload
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/// (que era self-attested → cualquiera con una clave Ed25519 podía anclar
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/// basura institucional bajo el hash público de un asset legítimo y
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/// envenenarlo de forma inmutable). Ahora solo una pubkey REGISTRADA puede
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/// anclar; un validador registrado que ancle basura es revocable y auditable
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/// (problema de governance, no ataque anónimo). Mismo patrón que
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/// `TierProfiles` de FIX-6 Stage 2a: legitimidad on-chain, no caller-supplied.
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///
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/// **Root-only interim** (sudo Index 12 / governance). Sunset: cuando el
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/// registro OIT real de Mathi (PerceptionAdapter + DID binding) aterrice,
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/// migra a auto-registro attestation-driven. Cross-link futuro: AgentIdentity
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/// (Index 9).
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#[pallet::storage]
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#[pallet::getter(fn authorized_validator_level)]
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pub type AuthorizedValidators<T: Config> =
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StorageMap<_, Blake2_128Concat, [u8; 32], u8, OptionQuery>;
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/// PROV-7 canonical: Events emisión canonical.
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#[pallet::event]
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#[pallet::generate_deposit(pub(super) fn deposit_event)]
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@@ -158,6 +184,19 @@ pub mod pallet {
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/// Reason canonical de rejection per RejectionReason enum.
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reason: RejectionReason,
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},
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/// FIX-4: validador Noesis autorizado (Root) con su nivel OIT. Auditable
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/// on-chain: quién quedó habilitado para anclar y a qué nivel.
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ValidatorRegistered {
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/// Ed25519 public key del validador autorizado.
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public_key: [u8; 32],
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/// Nivel OIT asignado por governance.
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level: u8,
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},
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/// FIX-4: validador revocado (Root) — ya no puede anclar.
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ValidatorRevoked {
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/// Ed25519 public key del validador revocado.
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public_key: [u8; 32],
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},
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}
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/// Rejection reasons canonical PROV-7.
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@@ -204,102 +243,138 @@ pub mod pallet {
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AlreadyAttested,
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/// Marihan refinement Phase 2.2 noted canonical.
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MalformedValidationAttestation,
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/// FIX-4: la pubkey del firmante NO está en el registro on-chain de
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/// validadores autorizados (cierra el squat — solo validadores
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/// registrados por governance pueden anclar).
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ValidatorNotAuthorized,
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}
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/// Dispatchables canonical (PROV-3 canonical: attest_asset).
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/// Dispatchables (PROV-3: attest_asset).
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#[pallet::call]
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impl<T: Config> Pallet<T> {
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/// PROV-3 canonical: `attest_asset` extrinsic canonical.
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/// PROV-3 + FIX-4: ancla una attestation Noesis verificada on-chain.
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///
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/// Submits a `ValidationAttestation` (Ergon Slice 7.0r struct) para
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/// anchoring canonical on-chain. Flow canonical 6-step per DC PROV-3:
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/// El validador firma OFF-CHAIN (con el helper de Ergon
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/// `attestation_signed_message`) sobre `TAG ‖ genesis_hash ‖ payload`,
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/// donde `payload` es el `SigningPayload` postcard (Slice 7.0r). El
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/// extrinsic recibe esos **bytes postcard opacos** + la firma; el pallet
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/// re-deriva el mensaje y verifica — NUNCA re-serializa (contrato ASP-3
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/// DC `076d15cc`). El `public_key` se DECODIFICA del payload (no es un
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/// parámetro aparte: la firma prueba que esa clave firmó esta attestation
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/// para esta cadena).
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///
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/// 1. PROV-4 canonical: Ed25519 signature verification canonical
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/// 2. PROV-5 canonical: validate `validator_oit.level >= 3` institutional
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/// 3. PROV-6 canonical: check `is_anchorable()` (verdict + severity)
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/// 4. PROV-2 canonical: convert ValidationAttestation → AssetAttestation
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/// 5. PROV-2 canonical: insert StorageMap canonical
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/// 6. PROV-7 canonical: emit AssetAttested event canonical
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///
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/// **SCAFFOLD v0.0.14 canonical**: real impl deferred post Ergon Cap 42+
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/// sub-crate ship + Ed25519 verification wire-up. Current canonical solo
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/// validates basic state (origin signed + not already attested) + emite
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/// placeholder event canonical.
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/// Flow (gates baratos antes del crypto caro, patrón FIX-3):
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/// 1. `ensure_signed` — el submitter (relayer/pagador del fee).
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/// 2. Decode postcard → (asset_id, public_key, level, verdict, severity).
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/// 3. **Dedup-by-BLAKE3 con RECHAZO EXPLÍCITO**: la storage key ES el
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/// `asset_id` (= BLAKE3 content hash del asset); un replay del mismo
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/// attestation firmado reusa el mismo asset_id → `AlreadyAttested`.
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/// (Decisión Pilar 4 sesión 6+: replay = rechazo explícito, no dedup
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/// silencioso.) Va ANTES del verify para no gastar crypto en replays.
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/// 4. FIX-4: gate de legitimidad ON-CHAIN — la pubkey del firmante debe
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/// estar en `AuthorizedValidators` (registro governance) con nivel
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/// >= 3. NO se confía en el `level` self-attested del payload (cierra
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/// el squat + tier-forgery).
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/// 5. PROV-6: gate anchorable (verdict Passed|Warning, severity Info|Warning).
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/// 6. FIX-4/V3-C1: Ed25519 verify via `sp_io::crypto::ed25519_verify`
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/// (host function, no bloatea wasm) sobre el mensaje domain-separado
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/// con el `genesis_hash` de ESTA cadena (cierra replay cross-chain).
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/// 7. Insert `AssetAttestation` (creator = validador, block real) + evento.
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#[pallet::call_index(0)]
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#[pallet::weight(Weight::from_parts(10_000, 0))]
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#[pallet::weight(Weight::from_parts(20_000, 0))]
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pub fn attest_asset(
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origin: OriginFor<T>,
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validation_attestation: ValidationAttestation,
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signing_payload: BoundedVec<u8, MaxPayloadLen>,
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signature: [u8; 64],
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) -> DispatchResult {
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// Verify origin canonical signed.
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let _signer = ensure_signed(origin)?;
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// 1. Origin signed (submitter — paga el fee; el creator semántico es
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// el validador cuya clave está dentro del payload firmado).
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let _submitter = ensure_signed(origin)?;
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let asset_hash = validation_attestation.asset_id;
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// 2. Decode postcard del SigningPayload real de Ergon (total, DoS-safe).
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let decoded = decode_signing_payload(&signing_payload)
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.map_err(|_| Error::<T>::MalformedValidationAttestation)?;
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let asset_hash = AssetHash::new(decoded.asset_id);
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// PROV-2 idempotency check canonical.
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// 3. Dedup-by-BLAKE3 (asset_id) — rechazo explícito de replay, antes
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// del crypto (FIX-3 discipline).
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ensure!(
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!Attestations::<T>::contains_key(asset_hash),
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Error::<T>::AlreadyAttested
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);
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// PROV-5 OIT level >= 3 enforcement canonical.
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// 4. FIX-4: legitimidad ON-CHAIN (cierra el squat + tier-forgery).
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// La pubkey del firmante DEBE estar en el registro de validadores
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// autorizados; el nivel es el del REGISTRO (governance), NO el
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// `level` self-attested del payload. Sin esto, cualquiera con una
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// clave Ed25519 anclaba basura institucional bajo el hash público
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// de un asset legítimo.
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let authorized_level = AuthorizedValidators::<T>::get(decoded.public_key)
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.ok_or(Error::<T>::ValidatorNotAuthorized)?;
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ensure!(authorized_level >= 3, Error::<T>::ValidatorTierInsufficient);
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// 5. PROV-6: anchorable (Inmutable #26 — una vez anclado es inmutable).
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ensure!(decoded.is_anchorable(), Error::<T>::NotAnchorable);
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// 6. FIX-4 (V3-C1): re-derivar el mensaje domain-separado con el
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// genesis_hash de ESTA cadena y verificar Ed25519 sobre los BYTES
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// recibidos (nunca re-serializar). Host function = no wasm bloat.
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let genesis_full = <frame_system::Pallet<T>>::block_hash(BlockNumberFor::<T>::zero());
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let genesis_ref: &[u8] = genesis_full.as_ref();
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let mut genesis_hash = [0u8; 32];
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let n = genesis_ref.len().min(32);
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genesis_hash[..n].copy_from_slice(&genesis_ref[..n]);
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let message = attestation_signed_message(&signing_payload, &genesis_hash);
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let sig = sp_core::ed25519::Signature::from_raw(signature);
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let pubkey = sp_core::ed25519::Public::from_raw(decoded.public_key);
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ensure!(
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validation_attestation.validator_oit.is_institutional(),
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Error::<T>::ValidatorTierInsufficient
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sp_io::crypto::ed25519_verify(&sig, &message, &pubkey),
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Error::<T>::InvalidSignature
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);
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// PROV-6 is_anchorable check canonical.
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ensure!(
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validation_attestation.is_anchorable(),
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Error::<T>::NotAnchorable
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);
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// PROV-4 canonical: Real Ed25519 verification via ed25519-dalek (v0.0.16).
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//
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// Pattern canonical:
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// 1. Reconstruct VerifyingKey desde validator_oit.public_key (32 bytes)
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// 2. Reconstruct Signature desde attestation.signature (64 bytes)
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// 3. Compute signing_payload canonical (SCALE encoding interim Option B)
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// 4. verify_strict canonical (rejects malleable signatures + zero-keys)
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//
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// Cuando Ergon arkhe-noesis-attestation-types ship Cap 42+, swap canonical
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// a postcard encoding canonical sin breaking pallet logic — verify call site
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// remains identical canonical.
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let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
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&validation_attestation.validator_oit.public_key,
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)
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.map_err(|_| Error::<T>::InvalidSignature)?;
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let signature = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(
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&validation_attestation.signature,
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);
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let payload = validation_attestation.signing_payload();
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pubkey
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.verify_strict(&payload, &signature)
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.map_err(|_| Error::<T>::InvalidSignature)?;
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// PROV-2 canonical: convert + insert canonical.
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// SCAFFOLD: minimal AssetAttestation construction (without creator/sig
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// mapping canonical — that's Ergon sub-crate concern post Cap 42+).
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// 7. Anclar: creator = el validador (su Ed25519 pubkey), block real.
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let block_number = <frame_system::Pallet<T>>::block_number();
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let attestation = AssetAttestation {
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hash: asset_hash,
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creator: origin_chain_types::AccountId::new([0u8; 32]), // SCAFFOLD placeholder
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signature: origin_chain_types::Signature::new(validation_attestation.signature),
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anchored_at_block: 0, // SCAFFOLD — block_number wire post v0.0.16
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agent_chain: origin_chain_types::AgentChain::default(), // BoundedVec empty
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creator: origin_chain_types::AccountId::new(decoded.public_key),
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signature: origin_chain_types::Signature::new(signature),
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anchored_at_block: block_number.saturated_into::<u64>(),
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agent_chain: origin_chain_types::AgentChain::default(),
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};
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Attestations::<T>::insert(asset_hash, attestation);
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// PROV-7 emit event canonical.
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let block_number = <frame_system::Pallet<T>>::block_number();
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Self::deposit_event(Event::AssetAttested {
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asset_hash,
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block_number,
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});
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Self::deposit_event(Event::AssetAttested { asset_hash, block_number });
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Ok(())
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}
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/// FIX-4: registra (o re-nivela) un validador Noesis autorizado a anclar.
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/// **Root-only** (sudo Index 12 / governance) — cierra el squat: solo
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/// validadores que governance habilita pueden anclar. Sunset a
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/// attestation-driven cuando el registro OIT de Mathi aterrice.
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#[pallet::call_index(1)]
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#[pallet::weight(Weight::from_parts(10_000, 0))]
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pub fn register_validator(
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origin: OriginFor<T>,
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public_key: [u8; 32],
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level: u8,
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) -> DispatchResult {
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ensure_root(origin)?;
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AuthorizedValidators::<T>::insert(public_key, level);
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Self::deposit_event(Event::ValidatorRegistered { public_key, level });
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Ok(())
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}
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/// FIX-4: revoca un validador — ya no puede anclar. **Root-only.**
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#[pallet::call_index(2)]
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#[pallet::weight(Weight::from_parts(10_000, 0))]
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pub fn revoke_validator(
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origin: OriginFor<T>,
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public_key: [u8; 32],
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) -> DispatchResult {
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ensure_root(origin)?;
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AuthorizedValidators::<T>::remove(public_key);
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Self::deposit_event(Event::ValidatorRevoked { public_key });
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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@@ -320,96 +395,15 @@ mod tests_integration;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
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use origin_chain_types::{OitIdentity, SeverityTier, ValidationAttestation, ValidationVerdict};
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// Compile-time + Ed25519 verify standalone tests canonical.
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// Mock runtime integration tests canonical = Phase 2.1 v0.0.17 next slice.
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fn signed_attestation(verdict: ValidationVerdict, severity: SeverityTier) -> ValidationAttestation {
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let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32]);
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let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
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let mut att = ValidationAttestation {
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schema_version: *b"1.0.0 ",
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asset_id: origin_chain_types::AssetHash::new([1u8; 32]),
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validator_oit: OitIdentity {
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public_key: verifying_key.to_bytes(),
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level: 3,
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},
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validated_at_us: 1234567890,
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verdict,
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severity,
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constraints_checked: 42,
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signature: [0u8; 64], // placeholder, replaced post sign
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};
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let payload = att.signing_payload();
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let signature = signing_key.sign(&payload);
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att.signature = signature.to_bytes();
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att
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}
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// FIX-4: la verificación Ed25519 real (sp_io host function sobre el mensaje
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// domain-separado, con golden vectors del oráculo de Ergon) vive en
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// `tests_integration`. El decoder postcard + el mensaje firmado se prueban
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// en `origin-chain-types::attestation_verify`. Aquí quedan compile-checks.
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#[test]
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fn ed25519_verify_real_valid_signature_canonical() {
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// PROV-4 canonical: signed attestation canonical verifies correctamente.
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let att = signed_attestation(ValidationVerdict::Passed, SeverityTier::Info);
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let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
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&att.validator_oit.public_key,
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)
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.expect("valid pubkey canonical");
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let sig = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(&att.signature);
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let payload = att.signing_payload();
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assert!(pubkey.verify_strict(&payload, &sig).is_ok());
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}
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#[test]
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fn ed25519_verify_tampered_signature_rejected_canonical() {
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// PROV-4 canonical: tampered signature canonical rejected.
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let mut att = signed_attestation(ValidationVerdict::Passed, SeverityTier::Info);
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// Flip a bit en signature canonical.
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att.signature[0] ^= 0xFF;
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let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
|
||||
&att.validator_oit.public_key,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid pubkey canonical");
|
||||
let sig = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(&att.signature);
|
||||
let payload = att.signing_payload();
|
||||
assert!(pubkey.verify_strict(&payload, &sig).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn ed25519_verify_tampered_payload_rejected_canonical() {
|
||||
// PROV-4 canonical: tampered payload canonical (signing_payload mismatch) rejected.
|
||||
let mut att = signed_attestation(ValidationVerdict::Passed, SeverityTier::Info);
|
||||
let original_sig = att.signature;
|
||||
// Flip a bit en asset_id (cambia signing_payload pero mantiene signature original).
|
||||
att.asset_id = origin_chain_types::AssetHash::new([99u8; 32]);
|
||||
let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
|
||||
&att.validator_oit.public_key,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid pubkey canonical");
|
||||
let sig = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(&original_sig);
|
||||
let payload = att.signing_payload(); // payload canonical NEW (con asset_id tampered)
|
||||
assert!(pubkey.verify_strict(&payload, &sig).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn ed25519_zero_signature_fails_verify_canonical() {
|
||||
// PROV-4 canonical: all-zero signature canonical rejected por verify_strict.
|
||||
// (Note: ed25519-dalek `from_bytes` acepta all-zero pubkey/sig — son
|
||||
// valid Edwards points; el rejection canonical pasa en verify_strict.)
|
||||
let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32]);
|
||||
let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
|
||||
let payload = b"any payload canonical";
|
||||
let zero_sig = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(&[0u8; 64]);
|
||||
assert!(verifying_key.verify_strict(payload, &zero_sig).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn pallet_scaffold_compiles_canonical() {
|
||||
// Scaffold compiles — verified by cargo check.
|
||||
// Real mock runtime integration tests = Phase 2.1 v0.0.17.
|
||||
fn pallet_compiles_canonical() {
|
||||
// Verified by cargo check. E2E del fee-path verify = tests_integration.
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user