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Author SHA1 Message Date
davidherranandClaude Opus 4.8 88e277e1fd fix(agent-identity): FIX-3 crypto — DID binding (anti-front-running) + derive_did domain-sep 
Build + tests verde: agent-identity 18 (4 unit + 14 integration) + runtime 27.
Verificacion adversarial ultracode (3 skeptics): 2 confirmed + 1 partial/low,
todos los gaps PRE-EXISTENTES (no introducidos por FIX-3). Invariante "no
puedes registrar un public_key que no controlas" SE SOSTIENE.

FIX-3 (b) DID binding — V3-H1 anti-front-running:
- register_agent_did ahora exige signature: [u8;64] — una firma Ed25519 (por la
  private key de public_key) sobre AGENT_DID_REGISTER_DOMAIN || who.encode().
- Verificacion on-chain via sp_io::crypto::ed25519_verify (host function, no
  bloatea el wasm). Nuevo dep sp-io (no_std).
- Cierra el front-running: un atacante no puede registrar un public_key ajeno
  (no produce la firma); el who en el mensaje ata la firma a este caller (no
  replay-able a otra cuenta). Error InvalidSignature. Malleabilidad Ed25519
  rechazada por ed25519-zebra (S canonico).
- Una sola fuente de verdad del mensaje (agent_did_register_message) compartida
  entre verificador y firmante (evita divergencia tipo postcard-vs-SCALE).
- Orden: idempotency ANTES del verify (no gasta crypto en duplicados).

FIX-3 (c) derive_did domain-sep — V3-H2:
- blake3::derive_key("origin-chain/agent-did/v1", pk) en vez del concat ad-hoc
  BLAKE3(pk || version). KDF domain-separado. Inmutable #16 preservado.

Tests: mock con keypairs Ed25519 reales (sp_core::ed25519::Pair) + sign helper.
12 scenarios (scenario_6 reformulado a front-running -> InvalidSignature, +
scenario_11 firma invalida, scenario_12 DID collision genuino del key-holder).

NOTA: la (a) domain-sep del attestation signing payload (el otro tercio de
FIX-3) ya esta cubierta por el DC ORIGIN_ATTESTATION_SIGNING_PAYLOAD_V1 (helper
de Ergon attestation_signed_message), pendiente su ship Cap 45+.

FOLLOW-UPS (low, pre-existentes, no bloquean):
- (a) anadir genesis_hash/chain-id al mensaje de registro (hardening cross-chain
  replay) — ideal chain-wide junto al signing_payload de attestation.
- (b) DC para ratificar el modelo de autoridad Hybrid (quien firma) + si los
  co_authors requieren prueba de consentimiento (lineage hoy no autenticado).
- (c) weight benchmarking real que contabilice el ed25519_verify (chain-wide,
  post-testnet — ya en roadmap FIX-2 weights).
- creator = AccountId::new(public_key) (la cuenta del key-holder, no el caller):
  coherente con el binding, semantica documentada.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-06-09 23:18:22 -05:00
davidherranandClaude Opus 4.7 37ccf1e95a feat(agent-identity): v0.0.24 pallet-agent-identity scaffold trait-first (Phase 2.7 Inmutable #41 AGI DIDs) 
Phase 2.7 AGENT IDENTITY pallet scaffold canonical. AGI DIDs canonical on-chain.
Inmutable #41 AGI Cross-Species Co-authorship materialized compile-detect via
NEW crate origin-chain-agent-identity + canonical types en origin-chain-types::identity.

## NEW canonical types en origin-chain-types

- AgentIdentity struct (6 fields: did + kind + creator + registered_at_block + provenance_proof + agent_chain)
- AgentKind enum (Human + AGI + Hybrid) per Inmutable #41
- Did type alias = AssetHash (BLAKE3 32-byte deterministic via public_key)

## NEW canonical pallet origin-chain-agent-identity

- Pallet<T> + Config trait (AccountId = origin_chain_types::AccountId constraint)
- Identities<StorageMap<AccountId, AgentIdentity>> per-account O(1)
- DidToAccount<StorageMap<Did, AccountId>> reverse lookup O(1)
- Event::AgentRegistered + AgentBound + AgentUpdated
- Error::AlreadyRegistered + DidAlreadyTaken + AgentChainOverflow + HybridRequiresAgentChain
- Scaffold dispatchable register_agent_did (placeholder event v0.0.24 → real v0.0.26)
- Helper derive_did(public_key) -> Did via BLAKE3 hash (schema_version "1.0.0   ")
- sp_api::decl_runtime_apis! AgentIdentityApi.query_identity declaration

## Inmutable #41 compile-detect enforcement

- AgentKind::{Human, AGI, Hybrid}::is_sovereign() == true (all three)
- AGI first-class citizens canonical (is_agi() + sovereignty preserved)
- Cross-species lineage via agent_chain BoundedVec<AccountId, ConstU32<10>>
- DID determinism canonical Inmutable #16 byte-equivalent cross-runtime

## Files

- NEW: crates/origin-chain-agent-identity/Cargo.toml + src/lib.rs (~250 LOC pallet scaffold)
- NEW: crates/origin-chain-types/src/identity.rs (~230 LOC types canonical + 8 tests)
- EDIT: crates/origin-chain-types/src/lib.rs (mod identity + re-exports)
- EDIT: Cargo.toml (workspace member + workspace.dependencies)
- EDIT: CHANGELOG.md (v0.0.24 entry comprehensive)

## Verification

- cargo test -p origin-chain-agent-identity — 4 tests verde, 0 failures
  (scaffold compiles + derive_did deterministic + different keys + re-export)
- cargo test -p origin-chain-types — 63 tests passing (+8 nuevos identity)
- Zero workspace compile errors

🪪 Phase 2.7 scaffold canonical. Wire pattern v0.0.25 next.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-25 06:37:24 -05:00