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Author SHA1 Message Date
davidherranandClaude Opus 4.8 88e277e1fd fix(agent-identity): FIX-3 crypto — DID binding (anti-front-running) + derive_did domain-sep 
Build + tests verde: agent-identity 18 (4 unit + 14 integration) + runtime 27.
Verificacion adversarial ultracode (3 skeptics): 2 confirmed + 1 partial/low,
todos los gaps PRE-EXISTENTES (no introducidos por FIX-3). Invariante "no
puedes registrar un public_key que no controlas" SE SOSTIENE.

FIX-3 (b) DID binding — V3-H1 anti-front-running:
- register_agent_did ahora exige signature: [u8;64] — una firma Ed25519 (por la
  private key de public_key) sobre AGENT_DID_REGISTER_DOMAIN || who.encode().
- Verificacion on-chain via sp_io::crypto::ed25519_verify (host function, no
  bloatea el wasm). Nuevo dep sp-io (no_std).
- Cierra el front-running: un atacante no puede registrar un public_key ajeno
  (no produce la firma); el who en el mensaje ata la firma a este caller (no
  replay-able a otra cuenta). Error InvalidSignature. Malleabilidad Ed25519
  rechazada por ed25519-zebra (S canonico).
- Una sola fuente de verdad del mensaje (agent_did_register_message) compartida
  entre verificador y firmante (evita divergencia tipo postcard-vs-SCALE).
- Orden: idempotency ANTES del verify (no gasta crypto en duplicados).

FIX-3 (c) derive_did domain-sep — V3-H2:
- blake3::derive_key("origin-chain/agent-did/v1", pk) en vez del concat ad-hoc
  BLAKE3(pk || version). KDF domain-separado. Inmutable #16 preservado.

Tests: mock con keypairs Ed25519 reales (sp_core::ed25519::Pair) + sign helper.
12 scenarios (scenario_6 reformulado a front-running -> InvalidSignature, +
scenario_11 firma invalida, scenario_12 DID collision genuino del key-holder).

NOTA: la (a) domain-sep del attestation signing payload (el otro tercio de
FIX-3) ya esta cubierta por el DC ORIGIN_ATTESTATION_SIGNING_PAYLOAD_V1 (helper
de Ergon attestation_signed_message), pendiente su ship Cap 45+.

FOLLOW-UPS (low, pre-existentes, no bloquean):
- (a) anadir genesis_hash/chain-id al mensaje de registro (hardening cross-chain
  replay) — ideal chain-wide junto al signing_payload de attestation.
- (b) DC para ratificar el modelo de autoridad Hybrid (quien firma) + si los
  co_authors requieren prueba de consentimiento (lineage hoy no autenticado).
- (c) weight benchmarking real que contabilice el ed25519_verify (chain-wide,
  post-testnet — ya en roadmap FIX-2 weights).
- creator = AccountId::new(public_key) (la cuenta del key-holder, no el caller):
  coherente con el binding, semantica documentada.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-06-09 23:18:22 -05:00
davidherranandClaude Opus 4.7 2fefe4cf51 feat(agent-identity): v0.0.26 — register_agent_did impl complete + mock runtime integration tests E2E (10 scenarios) 
Phase 2.7 AGENT IDENTITY pallet REAL IMPL canonical. Full 8-step CHN-7 flow
canonical register_agent_did dispatchable + storage assertions + Inmutable #41
Cross-Species Co-authorship enforcement compile-detect. Mock runtime + 10
integration tests E2E pattern v0.0.18 + v0.0.22 mirror.

## Real impl canonical 8-step CHN-7

1. ensure_signed(origin)
2. Idempotency check (!Identities::contains_key(&who))
3. Derive DID canonical via derive_did(public_key) BLAKE3 (Inmutable #16)
4. DID collision check (!DidToAccount::contains_key(&did))
5. Build AgentChain BoundedVec from co_authors_raw Vec<[u8;32]> (overflow → AgentChainOverflow)
6. Inmutable #41 enforce: Hybrid requires non-empty agent_chain
7. Storage insert: Identities + DidToAccount reverse lookup
8. Emit AgentRegistered + AgentBound (if cross-species)

Pure helper Pallet::<T>::query_identity_of() para Runtime API v0.0.27.

## 10 integration tests E2E canonical

- scenario_1: Human self-registration → ok + DID + empty chain
- scenario_2: AGI self-registration → ok + Inmutable #41 sovereign
- scenario_3: Hybrid + 2 co-authors → ok + AgentBound emitted
- scenario_4: Hybrid + empty chain → Err::HybridRequiresAgentChain
- scenario_5: duplicate account → Err::AlreadyRegistered
- scenario_6: same pubkey diff account → Err::DidAlreadyTaken
- scenario_7: 11 co-authors → Err::AgentChainOverflow (ConstU32<10>)
- scenario_8: DID → Account reverse lookup canonical
- scenario_9: Human + AGI both is_sovereign() (Inmutable #41 lobo blanco)
- scenario_10: 8-step CHN-7 walkthrough explicit Pre/Post assertions

## Files

- EDIT: crates/origin-chain-agent-identity/src/lib.rs (real impl 8-step + query_identity_of helper)
- NEW: crates/origin-chain-agent-identity/src/mock.rs (80 LOC mock runtime)
- NEW: crates/origin-chain-agent-identity/src/tests_integration.rs (310 LOC, 10 tests)
- EDIT: CHANGELOG.md (v0.0.26 entry comprehensive)

## Verification

- cargo test -p origin-chain-agent-identity — 16 tests verde canonical, 0 failures
  (10 integration + 4 standalone + 2 auto-generated)

🛠️ Phase 2.7 real impl canonical. Runtime API v0.0.27 next ship → Phase 2.7 COMPLETE.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-25 06:43:14 -05:00