//! # pallet-origin-provenance — Phase 2.1 COMPLETE + v0.0.18 mock runtime integration tests
//!
//! Asset attestation pallet canonical per CHN-7 + DC PROVENANCE_PALLET_V1
//! (6/10 firmas sesión 3+ 2026-05-24, deadline ratificación 2026-05-29).
//!
//! ## Status canonical: v0.0.18 — Mock runtime integration tests E2E own fixtures
//!
//! Este crate provee:
//! - Storage layout canonical `StorageMap<AssetHash, AssetAttestation>` (PROV-2) ✅
//! - Dispatchable canonical `attest_asset(origin, ValidationAttestation)` (PROV-3) ✅
//! - Real Ed25519 verify canonical via ed25519-dalek (PROV-4) ✅ v0.0.16
//! - OIT Level >= 3 enforcement canonical (PROV-5) ✅
//! - is_anchorable check canonical (PROV-6) ✅
//! - Events canonical `AssetAttested` + `AttestationRejected` (PROV-7) ✅
//! - Errors canonical (PROV-4/5/6) ✅
//! - Pallet Config trait canonical ✅
//! - Runtime API canonical `verify_provenance` (PROV-8) ✅ v0.0.17
//! - **Mock runtime + integration tests E2E own fixtures (v0.0.18 sesión 3+) ✅**
//!
//! ## v0.0.18 sesión 3+ mock runtime integration tests
//!
//! Per audit canonical sesión 3+ (`AUDIT_CHARON_SESION_3_STATE_V1.md`),
//! Ergon E2E fixture diary claim aspirational sin shipped commit verified.
//! Charon construye own fixtures basados en vendor copy ValidationAttestation
//! real existente. 9 integration tests canonical:
//!
//! - 5 scenarios PROV-3 flow: passed_info anchored + warning anchored +
//!   failed_critical rejected + passed_block_security rejected + anonymous_level_0 rejected
//! - 4 additional: idempotency + tampered_signature + tampered_payload + 6-step walkthrough
//!
//! Mock runtime composition canonical via `construct_runtime!` macro (System + Provenance).
//!
//! ## Lo que NO funciona aún (post-Ergon sub-crate Cap 42+)
//!
//! - Real `ValidationAttestation` consumption — usa vendor copy interim Option B
//!   (signing_payload usa SCALE encoding canonical; Ergon real sub-crate usará
//!   postcard encoding — swap canonical post Cap 42+ sin breaking pallet logic)
//! - Runtime API canonical `verify_provenance` (PROV-8) — v0.0.17 next slice
//!
//! Per Ergon decision (diary `3f773a03` 2026-05-24): él ships
//! `arkhe-noesis-attestation-types` standalone canonical Cap 42+ (target
//! 2026-05-30 → 06-05). Mientras tanto, mi vendor copy en
//! `origin-chain-types::attestation` permite avanzar canonical compile-only.
//!
//! ## Roadmap canonical post-ratificación DC PROVENANCE_PALLET_V1
//!
//! 1. **v0.0.14 (ESTA)**: Scaffold skeleton canonical compile-only
//! 2. **v0.0.15** (post 2026-05-29 DC ratify): Storage + events + errors wired
//! 3. **v0.0.16** (post 2026-06-05 Ergon sub-crate): Real Ed25519 + OIT verify
//! 4. **v0.0.17**: Runtime API canonical verify_provenance + wire en runtime
//! 5. **v0.1.0** (post Q3 2026 testnet): full integration end-to-end
//!
//! ## Cross-pillar consumers canonical desbloqueados (post-impl)
//!
//! - Trinity (Phanes) asset mesh BLAKE3 → `attest_asset` canonical
//! - Codex (.odoc) chain_attestation block populated by Vault tier
//! - Ethos (Sussi) credential NFT mint + chain attestation
//! - Atelier (Marihan) skill NFT mint via institutional wallet
//! - Origindocs (David ratificado 2026-05-24): academic IP defensible

#![cfg_attr(not(feature = "std"), no_std)]
#![warn(missing_docs)]

pub use pallet::*;

/// Re-export canonical types desde origin-chain-types para consumers.
pub use origin_chain_types::{
    AssetAttestation, AssetHash, OitIdentity, SeverityTier, ValidationAttestation,
    ValidationVerdict,
};

/// PROV-8 canonical: Runtime API canonical para light clients + indexers +
/// cross-pillar consumers.
///
/// Permite query canonical de attestation status sin necesidad de full node
/// access — light client envía hash → recibe `Option<AssetAttestation>` con
/// signature canonical + creator + block number canonical + agent chain.
///
/// Consumers canonical:
/// - Trinity (Phanes) — asset gallery render con attestation badge
/// - Codex (.odoc) — Vault tier verify-before-render canonical
/// - Codex origindocs — academic IP defensible verify
/// - Ethos (Sussi) — credential verification canonical
/// - Atelier (Marihan) — Skill Library Zona 6 verify-before-purchase
///
/// Future Phase 2.3 expansion canonical:
/// - `verify_by_creator(creator) -> Vec<AssetAttestation>` (paginated)
/// - `list_attestations_in_block(block_num) -> Vec<AssetAttestation>`
/// - `cross_runtime_proof(hash) -> CrossRuntimeProof`
sp_api::decl_runtime_apis! {
    /// Provenance runtime API canonical canonical (PROV-8).
    pub trait ProvenanceApi {
        /// Verify provenance canonical de un asset por su hash canonical.
        ///
        /// Returns `Some(AssetAttestation)` si attested previamente on-chain,
        /// `None` si nunca attested canonical. Read-only query canonical sin
        /// transaction fee canonical (off-chain via RPC).
        fn verify_provenance(hash: AssetHash) -> Option<AssetAttestation>;
    }
}

#[frame_support::pallet]
pub mod pallet {
    use frame_support::pallet_prelude::*;
    use frame_system::pallet_prelude::*;
    use origin_chain_types::{AssetAttestation, AssetHash, ValidationAttestation};

    /// Pallet configuration trait canonical.
    ///
    /// Per DC PROVENANCE_PALLET_V1 PROV-3 + ADR-0057 trait-seam discipline.
    #[pallet::config]
    pub trait Config: frame_system::Config {
        /// Runtime event type canonical wired into `RuntimeEvent` aggregate.
        type RuntimeEvent: From<Event<Self>>
            + IsType<<Self as frame_system::Config>::RuntimeEvent>;

        // Future canonical (post OCAFB ratify):
        // type OitFeeSchedule: arkhe_amis_server::OitFeeSchedule;
    }

    /// Pallet definition canonical.
    ///
    /// v0.0.15: `AssetAttestation.agent_chain` ahora es `BoundedVec<AccountId,
    /// ConstU32<10>>` canonical → MaxEncodedLen ahora satisfied canonical →
    /// `#[pallet::without_storage_info]` ya NO necesario canonical.
    /// StorageVersion en código (FIX-2 lifecycle, audit V1-H2/V2-CA2): arranca
    /// en 0 (genesis). Habilita migraciones futuras vía on_chain_storage_version().
    const STORAGE_VERSION: StorageVersion = StorageVersion::new(0);

    #[pallet::pallet]
    #[pallet::storage_version(STORAGE_VERSION)]
    pub struct Pallet<T>(_);

    /// PROV-2 canonical: `StorageMap<AssetHash, AssetAttestation>` canonical.
    ///
    /// O(1) lookup canonical via Blake2_128Concat hasher (FRAME-native canonical).
    /// Memory canonical ~140 bytes per attestation canonical.
    #[pallet::storage]
    #[pallet::getter(fn attestation_of)]
    pub type Attestations<T: Config> =
        StorageMap<_, Blake2_128Concat, AssetHash, AssetAttestation, OptionQuery>;

    /// PROV-7 canonical: Events emisión canonical.
    #[pallet::event]
    #[pallet::generate_deposit(pub(super) fn deposit_event)]
    pub enum Event<T: Config> {
        /// Asset attestation canonical anchored on-chain (PROV-7).
        AssetAttested {
            /// BLAKE3 content hash canonical del asset attested.
            asset_hash: AssetHash,
            /// Block number canonical at which attestation landed.
            block_number: BlockNumberFor<T>,
        },
        /// Attestation rejected canonical con reason canonical (PROV-7).
        AttestationRejected {
            /// BLAKE3 content hash canonical que falló validation.
            asset_hash: AssetHash,
            /// Reason canonical de rejection per RejectionReason enum.
            reason: RejectionReason,
        },
    }

    /// Rejection reasons canonical PROV-7.
    ///
    /// **Marihan refinement Phase 2.2 noted** (DC PROVENANCE_PALLET_V1 signature
    /// `2e6b8469`): añadir variant `MalformedValidationAttestation` para casos
    /// donde `signing_payload()` falle parse pre-Ed25519-verify. Non-blocking
    /// Phase 2.1 — incluido aquí canonical anticipated.
    #[derive(
        Encode,
        Decode,
        DecodeWithMemTracking,
        MaxEncodedLen,
        TypeInfo,
        Clone,
        Copy,
        PartialEq,
        Eq,
        RuntimeDebug,
    )]
    pub enum RejectionReason {
        /// Ed25519 signature verification canonical failed (PROV-4).
        InvalidSignature,
        /// Validator OIT level canonical < 3 (institutional required PROV-5).
        ValidatorTierInsufficient,
        /// Attestation NOT anchorable canonical per is_anchorable check (PROV-6).
        NotAnchorable,
        /// Asset hash canonical already attested previamente (idempotency canonical).
        AlreadyAttested,
        /// Validation attestation canonical malformed (Marihan refinement Phase 2.2).
        MalformedValidationAttestation,
    }

    /// Pallet errors canonical (PROV-4/5/6).
    #[pallet::error]
    pub enum Error<T> {
        /// PROV-4 canonical: Ed25519 signature verification canonical failed.
        InvalidSignature,
        /// PROV-5 canonical: validator OIT level canonical insufficient (< 3).
        ValidatorTierInsufficient,
        /// PROV-6 canonical: attestation NOT anchorable canonical (verdict/severity).
        NotAnchorable,
        /// PROV-2 canonical: asset hash canonical already attested previamente.
        AlreadyAttested,
        /// Marihan refinement Phase 2.2 noted canonical.
        MalformedValidationAttestation,
    }

    /// Dispatchables canonical (PROV-3 canonical: attest_asset).
    #[pallet::call]
    impl<T: Config> Pallet<T> {
        /// PROV-3 canonical: `attest_asset` extrinsic canonical.
        ///
        /// Submits a `ValidationAttestation` (Ergon Slice 7.0r struct) para
        /// anchoring canonical on-chain. Flow canonical 6-step per DC PROV-3:
        ///
        /// 1. PROV-4 canonical: Ed25519 signature verification canonical
        /// 2. PROV-5 canonical: validate `validator_oit.level >= 3` institutional
        /// 3. PROV-6 canonical: check `is_anchorable()` (verdict + severity)
        /// 4. PROV-2 canonical: convert ValidationAttestation → AssetAttestation
        /// 5. PROV-2 canonical: insert StorageMap canonical
        /// 6. PROV-7 canonical: emit AssetAttested event canonical
        ///
        /// **SCAFFOLD v0.0.14 canonical**: real impl deferred post Ergon Cap 42+
        /// sub-crate ship + Ed25519 verification wire-up. Current canonical solo
        /// validates basic state (origin signed + not already attested) + emite
        /// placeholder event canonical.
        #[pallet::call_index(0)]
        #[pallet::weight(Weight::from_parts(10_000, 0))]
        pub fn attest_asset(
            origin: OriginFor<T>,
            validation_attestation: ValidationAttestation,
        ) -> DispatchResult {
            // Verify origin canonical signed.
            let _signer = ensure_signed(origin)?;

            let asset_hash = validation_attestation.asset_id;

            // PROV-2 idempotency check canonical.
            ensure!(
                !Attestations::<T>::contains_key(asset_hash),
                Error::<T>::AlreadyAttested
            );

            // PROV-5 OIT level >= 3 enforcement canonical.
            ensure!(
                validation_attestation.validator_oit.is_institutional(),
                Error::<T>::ValidatorTierInsufficient
            );

            // PROV-6 is_anchorable check canonical.
            ensure!(
                validation_attestation.is_anchorable(),
                Error::<T>::NotAnchorable
            );

            // PROV-4 canonical: Real Ed25519 verification via ed25519-dalek (v0.0.16).
            //
            // Pattern canonical:
            // 1. Reconstruct VerifyingKey desde validator_oit.public_key (32 bytes)
            // 2. Reconstruct Signature desde attestation.signature (64 bytes)
            // 3. Compute signing_payload canonical (SCALE encoding interim Option B)
            // 4. verify_strict canonical (rejects malleable signatures + zero-keys)
            //
            // Cuando Ergon arkhe-noesis-attestation-types ship Cap 42+, swap canonical
            // a postcard encoding canonical sin breaking pallet logic — verify call site
            // remains identical canonical.
            let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
                &validation_attestation.validator_oit.public_key,
            )
            .map_err(|_| Error::<T>::InvalidSignature)?;

            let signature = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(
                &validation_attestation.signature,
            );

            let payload = validation_attestation.signing_payload();

            pubkey
                .verify_strict(&payload, &signature)
                .map_err(|_| Error::<T>::InvalidSignature)?;

            // PROV-2 canonical: convert + insert canonical.
            // SCAFFOLD: minimal AssetAttestation construction (without creator/sig
            // mapping canonical — that's Ergon sub-crate concern post Cap 42+).
            let attestation = AssetAttestation {
                hash: asset_hash,
                creator: origin_chain_types::AccountId::new([0u8; 32]), // SCAFFOLD placeholder
                signature: origin_chain_types::Signature::new(validation_attestation.signature),
                anchored_at_block: 0, // SCAFFOLD — block_number wire post v0.0.16
                agent_chain: origin_chain_types::AgentChain::default(), // BoundedVec empty
            };

            Attestations::<T>::insert(asset_hash, attestation);

            // PROV-7 emit event canonical.
            let block_number = <frame_system::Pallet<T>>::block_number();
            Self::deposit_event(Event::AssetAttested {
                asset_hash,
                block_number,
            });

            Ok(())
        }
    }
}

extern crate alloc;

// v0.0.18 — Mock runtime canonical + integration tests E2E PROV-3 flow.
// Per audit canonical sesión 3+ (`AUDIT_CHARON_SESION_3_STATE_V1.md`),
// own fixtures basados en vendor copy ValidationAttestation real existente
// (no depender de Ergon E2E fixture diary claim aspirational).
#[cfg(test)]
pub mod mock;

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests_integration;

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
    use origin_chain_types::{OitIdentity, SeverityTier, ValidationAttestation, ValidationVerdict};

    // Compile-time + Ed25519 verify standalone tests canonical.
    // Mock runtime integration tests canonical = Phase 2.1 v0.0.17 next slice.

    fn signed_attestation(verdict: ValidationVerdict, severity: SeverityTier) -> ValidationAttestation {
        let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32]);
        let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();

        let mut att = ValidationAttestation {
            schema_version: *b"1.0.0   ",
            asset_id: origin_chain_types::AssetHash::new([1u8; 32]),
            validator_oit: OitIdentity {
                public_key: verifying_key.to_bytes(),
                level: 3,
            },
            validated_at_us: 1234567890,
            verdict,
            severity,
            constraints_checked: 42,
            signature: [0u8; 64], // placeholder, replaced post sign
        };

        let payload = att.signing_payload();
        let signature = signing_key.sign(&payload);
        att.signature = signature.to_bytes();
        att
    }

    #[test]
    fn ed25519_verify_real_valid_signature_canonical() {
        // PROV-4 canonical: signed attestation canonical verifies correctamente.
        let att = signed_attestation(ValidationVerdict::Passed, SeverityTier::Info);
        let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
            &att.validator_oit.public_key,
        )
        .expect("valid pubkey canonical");
        let sig = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(&att.signature);
        let payload = att.signing_payload();
        assert!(pubkey.verify_strict(&payload, &sig).is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn ed25519_verify_tampered_signature_rejected_canonical() {
        // PROV-4 canonical: tampered signature canonical rejected.
        let mut att = signed_attestation(ValidationVerdict::Passed, SeverityTier::Info);
        // Flip a bit en signature canonical.
        att.signature[0] ^= 0xFF;
        let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
            &att.validator_oit.public_key,
        )
        .expect("valid pubkey canonical");
        let sig = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(&att.signature);
        let payload = att.signing_payload();
        assert!(pubkey.verify_strict(&payload, &sig).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn ed25519_verify_tampered_payload_rejected_canonical() {
        // PROV-4 canonical: tampered payload canonical (signing_payload mismatch) rejected.
        let mut att = signed_attestation(ValidationVerdict::Passed, SeverityTier::Info);
        let original_sig = att.signature;
        // Flip a bit en asset_id (cambia signing_payload pero mantiene signature original).
        att.asset_id = origin_chain_types::AssetHash::new([99u8; 32]);
        let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
            &att.validator_oit.public_key,
        )
        .expect("valid pubkey canonical");
        let sig = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(&original_sig);
        let payload = att.signing_payload(); // payload canonical NEW (con asset_id tampered)
        assert!(pubkey.verify_strict(&payload, &sig).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn ed25519_zero_signature_fails_verify_canonical() {
        // PROV-4 canonical: all-zero signature canonical rejected por verify_strict.
        // (Note: ed25519-dalek `from_bytes` acepta all-zero pubkey/sig — son
        // valid Edwards points; el rejection canonical pasa en verify_strict.)
        let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32]);
        let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
        let payload = b"any payload canonical";
        let zero_sig = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(&[0u8; 64]);
        assert!(verifying_key.verify_strict(payload, &zero_sig).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn pallet_scaffold_compiles_canonical() {
        // Scaffold compiles — verified by cargo check.
        // Real mock runtime integration tests = Phase 2.1 v0.0.17.
    }

    #[test]
    fn rejection_reason_variants_canonical() {
        // Verify enum variants canonical exist + Marihan refinement included.
        let r1 = RejectionReason::InvalidSignature;
        let r2 = RejectionReason::ValidatorTierInsufficient;
        let _r3 = RejectionReason::NotAnchorable;
        let r4 = RejectionReason::AlreadyAttested;
        let r5 = RejectionReason::MalformedValidationAttestation;
        assert_ne!(
            core::mem::discriminant(&r1),
            core::mem::discriminant(&r2)
        );
        assert_ne!(
            core::mem::discriminant(&r4),
            core::mem::discriminant(&r5)
        );
    }
}