arkhe-origin-chain/crates/origin-chain-provenance/src/lib.rs

//! # pallet-origin-provenance — Phase 2.1 COMPLETE + v0.0.18 mock runtime integration tests
//!
//! Asset attestation pallet canonical per CHN-7 + DC PROVENANCE_PALLET_V1
//! (6/10 firmas sesión 3+ 2026-05-24, deadline ratificación 2026-05-29).
//!
//! ## Status canonical: v0.0.18 — Mock runtime integration tests E2E own fixtures
//!
//! Este crate provee:
//! - Storage layout canonical `StorageMap<AssetHash, AssetAttestation>` (PROV-2) ✅
//! - Dispatchable canonical `attest_asset(origin, ValidationAttestation)` (PROV-3) ✅
//! - Real Ed25519 verify canonical via ed25519-dalek (PROV-4) ✅ v0.0.16
//! - OIT Level >= 3 enforcement canonical (PROV-5) ✅
//! - is_anchorable check canonical (PROV-6) ✅
//! - Events canonical `AssetAttested` + `AttestationRejected` (PROV-7) ✅
//! - Errors canonical (PROV-4/5/6) ✅
//! - Pallet Config trait canonical ✅
//! - Runtime API canonical `verify_provenance` (PROV-8) ✅ v0.0.17
//! - **Mock runtime + integration tests E2E own fixtures (v0.0.18 sesión 3+) ✅**
//!
//! ## v0.0.18 sesión 3+ mock runtime integration tests
//!
//! Per audit canonical sesión 3+ (`AUDIT_CHARON_SESION_3_STATE_V1.md`),
//! Ergon E2E fixture diary claim aspirational sin shipped commit verified.
//! Charon construye own fixtures basados en vendor copy ValidationAttestation
//! real existente. 9 integration tests canonical:
//!
//! - 5 scenarios PROV-3 flow: passed_info anchored + warning anchored +
//!   failed_critical rejected + passed_block_security rejected + anonymous_level_0 rejected
//! - 4 additional: idempotency + tampered_signature + tampered_payload + 6-step walkthrough
//!
//! Mock runtime composition canonical via `construct_runtime!` macro (System + Provenance).
//!
//! ## Lo que NO funciona aún (post-Ergon sub-crate Cap 42+)
//!
//! - Real `ValidationAttestation` consumption — usa vendor copy interim Option B
//!   (signing_payload usa SCALE encoding canonical; Ergon real sub-crate usará
//!   postcard encoding — swap canonical post Cap 42+ sin breaking pallet logic)
//! - Runtime API canonical `verify_provenance` (PROV-8) — v0.0.17 next slice
//!
//! Per Ergon decision (diary `3f773a03` 2026-05-24): él ships
//! `arkhe-noesis-attestation-types` standalone canonical Cap 42+ (target
//! 2026-05-30 → 06-05). Mientras tanto, mi vendor copy en
//! `origin-chain-types::attestation` permite avanzar canonical compile-only.
//!
//! ## Roadmap canonical post-ratificación DC PROVENANCE_PALLET_V1
//!
//! 1. **v0.0.14 (ESTA)**: Scaffold skeleton canonical compile-only
//! 2. **v0.0.15** (post 2026-05-29 DC ratify): Storage + events + errors wired
//! 3. **v0.0.16** (post 2026-06-05 Ergon sub-crate): Real Ed25519 + OIT verify
//! 4. **v0.0.17**: Runtime API canonical verify_provenance + wire en runtime
//! 5. **v0.1.0** (post Q3 2026 testnet): full integration end-to-end
//!
//! ## Cross-pillar consumers canonical desbloqueados (post-impl)
//!
//! - Trinity (Phanes) asset mesh BLAKE3 → `attest_asset` canonical
//! - Codex (.odoc) chain_attestation block populated by Vault tier
//! - Ethos (Sussi) credential NFT mint + chain attestation
//! - Atelier (Marihan) skill NFT mint via institutional wallet
//! - Origindocs (David ratificado 2026-05-24): academic IP defensible

#![cfg_attr(not(feature = "std"), no_std)]
#![warn(missing_docs)]

pub use pallet::*;

/// Weights canonical (INTERIM hand-derived DB-aware — ver `weights.rs` §Estado).
pub mod weights;
pub use weights::WeightInfo;

/// Re-export canonical types desde origin-chain-types para consumers.
pub use origin_chain_types::{
    AssetAttestation, AssetHash, OitIdentity, SeverityTier, ValidationAttestation,
    ValidationVerdict,
};

/// PROV-8 canonical: Runtime API canonical para light clients + indexers +
/// cross-pillar consumers.
///
/// Permite query canonical de attestation status sin necesidad de full node
/// access — light client envía hash → recibe `Option<AssetAttestation>` con
/// signature canonical + creator + block number canonical + agent chain.
///
/// Consumers canonical:
/// - Trinity (Phanes) — asset gallery render con attestation badge
/// - Codex (.odoc) — Vault tier verify-before-render canonical
/// - Codex origindocs — academic IP defensible verify
/// - Ethos (Sussi) — credential verification canonical
/// - Atelier (Marihan) — Skill Library Zona 6 verify-before-purchase
///
/// Future Phase 2.3 expansion canonical:
/// - `verify_by_creator(creator) -> Vec<AssetAttestation>` (paginated)
/// - `list_attestations_in_block(block_num) -> Vec<AssetAttestation>`
/// - `cross_runtime_proof(hash) -> CrossRuntimeProof`
sp_api::decl_runtime_apis! {
    /// Provenance runtime API canonical canonical (PROV-8).
    pub trait ProvenanceApi {
        /// Verify provenance canonical de un asset por su hash canonical.
        ///
        /// Returns `Some(AssetAttestation)` si attested previamente on-chain,
        /// `None` si nunca attested canonical. Read-only query canonical sin
        /// transaction fee canonical (off-chain via RPC).
        fn verify_provenance(hash: AssetHash) -> Option<AssetAttestation>;
    }
}

#[frame_support::pallet]
pub mod pallet {
    use frame_support::pallet_prelude::*;
    use frame_system::pallet_prelude::*;
    use frame_support::sp_runtime::traits::{SaturatedConversion, Zero};
    use origin_chain_types::{
        attestation_signed_message, decode_signing_payload, AssetAttestation, AssetHash,
    };
    // Trait de weights en scope para resolver `T::WeightInfo::<method>()`.
    use crate::weights::WeightInfo;

    /// Cota DoS del `signing_payload` postcard recibido (el real ~115 bytes;
    /// 512 es holgado para schema/identifier futuros sin permitir flooding).
    pub type MaxPayloadLen = ConstU32<512>;

    /// Pallet configuration trait canonical.
    ///
    /// Per DC PROVENANCE_PALLET_V1 PROV-3 + ADR-0057 trait-seam discipline.
    #[pallet::config]
    pub trait Config: frame_system::Config {
        /// Runtime event type canonical wired into `RuntimeEvent` aggregate.
        type RuntimeEvent: From<Event<Self>>
            + IsType<<Self as frame_system::Config>::RuntimeEvent>;

        /// Weight information canonical para los extrinsics de este pallet.
        /// El runtime lo cablea a `weights::SubstrateWeight<Runtime>`; los mocks
        /// usan `()`. Ver `weights.rs` + `benchmarking.rs`.
        type WeightInfo: crate::weights::WeightInfo;

        // Future canonical (post OCAFB ratify):
        // type OitFeeSchedule: arkhe_amis_server::OitFeeSchedule;
    }

    /// Pallet definition canonical.
    ///
    /// v0.0.15: `AssetAttestation.agent_chain` ahora es `BoundedVec<AccountId,
    /// ConstU32<10>>` canonical → MaxEncodedLen ahora satisfied canonical →
    /// `#[pallet::without_storage_info]` ya NO necesario canonical.
    /// StorageVersion en código (FIX-2 lifecycle, audit V1-H2/V2-CA2): arranca
    /// en 0 (genesis). Habilita migraciones futuras vía on_chain_storage_version().
    const STORAGE_VERSION: StorageVersion = StorageVersion::new(0);

    #[pallet::pallet]
    #[pallet::storage_version(STORAGE_VERSION)]
    pub struct Pallet<T>(_);

    /// PROV-2 canonical: `StorageMap<AssetHash, AssetAttestation>` canonical.
    ///
    /// O(1) lookup canonical via Blake2_128Concat hasher (FRAME-native canonical).
    /// Memory canonical ~140 bytes per attestation canonical.
    #[pallet::storage]
    #[pallet::getter(fn attestation_of)]
    pub type Attestations<T: Config> =
        StorageMap<_, Blake2_128Concat, AssetHash, AssetAttestation, OptionQuery>;

    /// FIX-4 (cierra el HIGH "asset-id squat"): registro on-chain de validadores
    /// Noesis autorizados → nivel OIT asignado por governance. **La membresía es
    /// la VERDAD**, no el `level` que el firmante pone en su propio payload
    /// (que era self-attested → cualquiera con una clave Ed25519 podía anclar
    /// basura institucional bajo el hash público de un asset legítimo y
    /// envenenarlo de forma inmutable). Ahora solo una pubkey REGISTRADA puede
    /// anclar; un validador registrado que ancle basura es revocable y auditable
    /// (problema de governance, no ataque anónimo). Mismo patrón que
    /// `TierProfiles` de FIX-6 Stage 2a: legitimidad on-chain, no caller-supplied.
    ///
    /// **Root-only interim** (sudo Index 12 / governance). Sunset: cuando el
    /// registro OIT real de Mathi (PerceptionAdapter + DID binding) aterrice,
    /// migra a auto-registro attestation-driven. Cross-link futuro: AgentIdentity
    /// (Index 9).
    #[pallet::storage]
    #[pallet::getter(fn authorized_validator_level)]
    pub type AuthorizedValidators<T: Config> =
        StorageMap<_, Blake2_128Concat, [u8; 32], u8, OptionQuery>;

    /// PROV-7 canonical: Events emisión canonical.
    #[pallet::event]
    #[pallet::generate_deposit(pub(super) fn deposit_event)]
    pub enum Event<T: Config> {
        /// Asset attestation canonical anchored on-chain (PROV-7).
        AssetAttested {
            /// BLAKE3 content hash canonical del asset attested.
            asset_hash: AssetHash,
            /// Block number canonical at which attestation landed.
            block_number: BlockNumberFor<T>,
        },
        /// Attestation rejected canonical con reason canonical (PROV-7).
        AttestationRejected {
            /// BLAKE3 content hash canonical que falló validation.
            asset_hash: AssetHash,
            /// Reason canonical de rejection per RejectionReason enum.
            reason: RejectionReason,
        },
        /// FIX-4: validador Noesis autorizado (Root) con su nivel OIT. Auditable
        /// on-chain: quién quedó habilitado para anclar y a qué nivel.
        ValidatorRegistered {
            /// Ed25519 public key del validador autorizado.
            public_key: [u8; 32],
            /// Nivel OIT asignado por governance.
            level: u8,
        },
        /// FIX-4: validador revocado (Root) — ya no puede anclar.
        ValidatorRevoked {
            /// Ed25519 public key del validador revocado.
            public_key: [u8; 32],
        },
    }

    /// Rejection reasons canonical PROV-7.
    ///
    /// **Marihan refinement Phase 2.2 noted** (DC PROVENANCE_PALLET_V1 signature
    /// `2e6b8469`): añadir variant `MalformedValidationAttestation` para casos
    /// donde `signing_payload()` falle parse pre-Ed25519-verify. Non-blocking
    /// Phase 2.1 — incluido aquí canonical anticipated.
    #[derive(
        Encode,
        Decode,
        DecodeWithMemTracking,
        MaxEncodedLen,
        TypeInfo,
        Clone,
        Copy,
        PartialEq,
        Eq,
        RuntimeDebug,
    )]
    pub enum RejectionReason {
        /// Ed25519 signature verification canonical failed (PROV-4).
        InvalidSignature,
        /// Validator OIT level canonical < 3 (institutional required PROV-5).
        ValidatorTierInsufficient,
        /// Attestation NOT anchorable canonical per is_anchorable check (PROV-6).
        NotAnchorable,
        /// Asset hash canonical already attested previamente (idempotency canonical).
        AlreadyAttested,
        /// Validation attestation canonical malformed (Marihan refinement Phase 2.2).
        MalformedValidationAttestation,
    }

    /// Pallet errors canonical (PROV-4/5/6).
    #[pallet::error]
    pub enum Error<T> {
        /// PROV-4 canonical: Ed25519 signature verification canonical failed.
        InvalidSignature,
        /// PROV-5 canonical: validator OIT level canonical insufficient (< 3).
        ValidatorTierInsufficient,
        /// PROV-6 canonical: attestation NOT anchorable canonical (verdict/severity).
        NotAnchorable,
        /// PROV-2 canonical: asset hash canonical already attested previamente.
        AlreadyAttested,
        /// Marihan refinement Phase 2.2 noted canonical.
        MalformedValidationAttestation,
        /// FIX-4: la pubkey del firmante NO está en el registro on-chain de
        /// validadores autorizados (cierra el squat — solo validadores
        /// registrados por governance pueden anclar).
        ValidatorNotAuthorized,
    }

    /// Dispatchables (PROV-3: attest_asset).
    #[pallet::call]
    impl<T: Config> Pallet<T> {
        /// PROV-3 + FIX-4: ancla una attestation Noesis verificada on-chain.
        ///
        /// El validador firma OFF-CHAIN (con el helper de Ergon
        /// `attestation_signed_message`) sobre `TAG ‖ genesis_hash ‖ payload`,
        /// donde `payload` es el `SigningPayload` postcard (Slice 7.0r). El
        /// extrinsic recibe esos **bytes postcard opacos** + la firma; el pallet
        /// re-deriva el mensaje y verifica — NUNCA re-serializa (contrato ASP-3
        /// DC `076d15cc`). El `public_key` se DECODIFICA del payload (no es un
        /// parámetro aparte: la firma prueba que esa clave firmó esta attestation
        /// para esta cadena).
        ///
        /// Flow (gates baratos antes del crypto caro, patrón FIX-3):
        /// 1. `ensure_signed` — el submitter (relayer/pagador del fee).
        /// 2. Decode postcard → (asset_id, public_key, level, verdict, severity).
        /// 3. **Dedup-by-BLAKE3 con RECHAZO EXPLÍCITO**: la storage key ES el
        ///    `asset_id` (= BLAKE3 content hash del asset); un replay del mismo
        ///    attestation firmado reusa el mismo asset_id → `AlreadyAttested`.
        ///    (Decisión Pilar 4 sesión 6+: replay = rechazo explícito, no dedup
        ///    silencioso.) Va ANTES del verify para no gastar crypto en replays.
        /// 4. FIX-4: gate de legitimidad ON-CHAIN — la pubkey del firmante debe
        ///    estar en `AuthorizedValidators` (registro governance) con nivel
        ///    >= 3. NO se confía en el `level` self-attested del payload (cierra
        ///    el squat + tier-forgery).
        /// 5. PROV-6: gate anchorable (verdict Passed|Warning, severity Info|Warning).
        /// 6. FIX-4/V3-C1: Ed25519 verify via `sp_io::crypto::ed25519_verify`
        ///    (host function, no bloatea wasm) sobre el mensaje domain-separado
        ///    con el `genesis_hash` de ESTA cadena (cierra replay cross-chain).
        /// 7. Insert `AssetAttestation` (creator = validador, block real) + evento.
        #[pallet::call_index(0)]
        #[pallet::weight(T::WeightInfo::attest_asset())]
        pub fn attest_asset(
            origin: OriginFor<T>,
            signing_payload: BoundedVec<u8, MaxPayloadLen>,
            signature: [u8; 64],
        ) -> DispatchResult {
            // 1. Origin signed (submitter — paga el fee; el creator semántico es
            //    el validador cuya clave está dentro del payload firmado).
            let _submitter = ensure_signed(origin)?;

            // 2. Decode postcard del SigningPayload real de Ergon (total, DoS-safe).
            let decoded = decode_signing_payload(&signing_payload)
                .map_err(|_| Error::<T>::MalformedValidationAttestation)?;
            let asset_hash = AssetHash::new(decoded.asset_id);

            // 3. Dedup-by-BLAKE3 (asset_id) — rechazo explícito de replay, antes
            //    del crypto (FIX-3 discipline).
            ensure!(
                !Attestations::<T>::contains_key(asset_hash),
                Error::<T>::AlreadyAttested
            );

            // 4. FIX-4: legitimidad ON-CHAIN (cierra el squat + tier-forgery).
            //    La pubkey del firmante DEBE estar en el registro de validadores
            //    autorizados; el nivel es el del REGISTRO (governance), NO el
            //    `level` self-attested del payload. Sin esto, cualquiera con una
            //    clave Ed25519 anclaba basura institucional bajo el hash público
            //    de un asset legítimo.
            let authorized_level = AuthorizedValidators::<T>::get(decoded.public_key)
                .ok_or(Error::<T>::ValidatorNotAuthorized)?;
            ensure!(authorized_level >= 3, Error::<T>::ValidatorTierInsufficient);

            // 5. PROV-6: anchorable (Inmutable #26 — una vez anclado es inmutable).
            ensure!(decoded.is_anchorable(), Error::<T>::NotAnchorable);

            // 6. FIX-4 (V3-C1): re-derivar el mensaje domain-separado con el
            //    genesis_hash de ESTA cadena y verificar Ed25519 sobre los BYTES
            //    recibidos (nunca re-serializar). Host function = no wasm bloat.
            let genesis_full = <frame_system::Pallet<T>>::block_hash(BlockNumberFor::<T>::zero());
            let genesis_ref: &[u8] = genesis_full.as_ref();
            let mut genesis_hash = [0u8; 32];
            let n = genesis_ref.len().min(32);
            genesis_hash[..n].copy_from_slice(&genesis_ref[..n]);

            let message = attestation_signed_message(&signing_payload, &genesis_hash);
            let sig = sp_core::ed25519::Signature::from_raw(signature);
            let pubkey = sp_core::ed25519::Public::from_raw(decoded.public_key);
            ensure!(
                sp_io::crypto::ed25519_verify(&sig, &message, &pubkey),
                Error::<T>::InvalidSignature
            );

            // 7. Anclar: creator = el validador (su Ed25519 pubkey), block real.
            let block_number = <frame_system::Pallet<T>>::block_number();
            let attestation = AssetAttestation {
                hash: asset_hash,
                creator: origin_chain_types::AccountId::new(decoded.public_key),
                signature: origin_chain_types::Signature::new(signature),
                anchored_at_block: block_number.saturated_into::<u64>(),
                agent_chain: origin_chain_types::AgentChain::default(),
            };
            Attestations::<T>::insert(asset_hash, attestation);

            Self::deposit_event(Event::AssetAttested { asset_hash, block_number });
            Ok(())
        }

        /// FIX-4: registra (o re-nivela) un validador Noesis autorizado a anclar.
        /// **Root-only** (sudo Index 12 / governance) — cierra el squat: solo
        /// validadores que governance habilita pueden anclar. Sunset a
        /// attestation-driven cuando el registro OIT de Mathi aterrice.
        #[pallet::call_index(1)]
        #[pallet::weight(T::WeightInfo::register_validator())]
        pub fn register_validator(
            origin: OriginFor<T>,
            public_key: [u8; 32],
            level: u8,
        ) -> DispatchResult {
            ensure_root(origin)?;
            AuthorizedValidators::<T>::insert(public_key, level);
            Self::deposit_event(Event::ValidatorRegistered { public_key, level });
            Ok(())
        }

        /// FIX-4: revoca un validador — ya no puede anclar. **Root-only.**
        #[pallet::call_index(2)]
        #[pallet::weight(T::WeightInfo::revoke_validator())]
        pub fn revoke_validator(
            origin: OriginFor<T>,
            public_key: [u8; 32],
        ) -> DispatchResult {
            ensure_root(origin)?;
            AuthorizedValidators::<T>::remove(public_key);
            Self::deposit_event(Event::ValidatorRevoked { public_key });
            Ok(())
        }
    }
}

extern crate alloc;

/// Benchmarks canonical (FRAME v2) — solo bajo la feature `runtime-benchmarks`.
/// Verificados por `impl_benchmark_test_suite!` en el mock (ver `benchmarking.rs`).
#[cfg(feature = "runtime-benchmarks")]
mod benchmarking;

// v0.0.18 — Mock runtime canonical + integration tests E2E PROV-3 flow.
// Per audit canonical sesión 3+ (`AUDIT_CHARON_SESION_3_STATE_V1.md`),
// own fixtures basados en vendor copy ValidationAttestation real existente
// (no depender de Ergon E2E fixture diary claim aspirational).
#[cfg(test)]
pub mod mock;

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests_integration;

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    // FIX-4: la verificación Ed25519 real (sp_io host function sobre el mensaje
    // domain-separado, con golden vectors del oráculo de Ergon) vive en
    // `tests_integration`. El decoder postcard + el mensaje firmado se prueban
    // en `origin-chain-types::attestation_verify`. Aquí quedan compile-checks.

    #[test]
    fn pallet_compiles_canonical() {
        // Verified by cargo check. E2E del fee-path verify = tests_integration.
    }

    #[test]
    fn rejection_reason_variants_canonical() {
        // Verify enum variants canonical exist + Marihan refinement included.
        let r1 = RejectionReason::InvalidSignature;
        let r2 = RejectionReason::ValidatorTierInsufficient;
        let _r3 = RejectionReason::NotAnchorable;
        let r4 = RejectionReason::AlreadyAttested;
        let r5 = RejectionReason::MalformedValidationAttestation;
        assert_ne!(
            core::mem::discriminant(&r1),
            core::mem::discriminant(&r2)
        );
        assert_ne!(
            core::mem::discriminant(&r4),
            core::mem::discriminant(&r5)
        );
    }
}