feat(provenance): Phase 2.1 v0.0.16 — Real Ed25519 verification (PROV-4 COMPLETE)
PROV-4 sub-decision COMPLETE end-to-end canonical via ed25519-dalek directly en pallet. Pattern análogo Slice 3 mock-WASM: no esperar Ergon Cap 42+ sub-crate, ship real impl con interim SCALE encoding (swap canonical post sub-crate land). Real verify implementation: - VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&validator_oit.public_key) — InvalidSignature si reject - Signature::from_bytes(&attestation.signature) reconstruct - signing_payload() compute (SCALE encoding interim Option B) - verify_strict(payload, signature) — InvalidSignature si fail (rejects malleable + zero-key attacks) 4 nuevos tests Ed25519 verify real canonical: - ed25519_verify_real_valid_signature_canonical — signed attestation verifies - ed25519_verify_tampered_signature_rejected_canonical — bit-flipped sig rejected - ed25519_verify_tampered_payload_rejected_canonical — tampered asset_id rejected - ed25519_zero_signature_fails_verify_canonical — zero sig rejected verify_strict - Helper signed_attestation() function canonical para test setup Honest disclosure canonical: mi signing_payload usa SCALE encoding (vendor copy interim Option B). Ergon arkhe-noesis-attestation-types Cap 42+ usará postcard encoding canonical per Slice 7.0r spec. Swap canonical será 1-line change en signing_payload() — zero impact en pallet verify logic. PROV sub-decisions status v0.0.16: 6/8 COMPLETE (PROV-1+2+3+4+5+6+7 done, PROV-8 Runtime API verify_provenance = v0.0.17 next slice). Verification: - cargo check workspace verde 1.55s - 6/6 pallet tests pass (4 nuevos Ed25519 real) - NO REGRESSION runtime/node/chain_spec builder Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -6,6 +6,84 @@ by [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/). Versions follow
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## [Unreleased]
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## [0.0.16] — 2026-05-24 — Phase 2.1 PROVENANCE pallet Real Ed25519 verification (PROV-4 complete)
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**Phase 2.1 v0.0.16** — Real Ed25519 verification implementation completa
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canonical via `ed25519-dalek` directly en pallet. PROV-4 sub-decision COMPLETE
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end-to-end. Pattern análogo Slice 3 mock-WASM (no esperar bloqueador externo,
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ship real impl con interim encoding).
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### Deliverables
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**Real PROV-4 Ed25519 verify implementation**:
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- `crates/origin-chain-provenance/src/lib.rs` — replace SCAFFOLD placeholder
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- Pattern canonical:
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1. `VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&validator_oit.public_key)` → `Error::InvalidSignature` si rejected
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2. `Signature::from_bytes(&attestation.signature)` reconstruct canonical
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3. `validation_attestation.signing_payload()` compute (SCALE encoding interim Option B)
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4. `pubkey.verify_strict(&payload, &signature)` → `Error::InvalidSignature` si fail
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- `verify_strict` canonical rejects malleable signatures + zero-keys + other Ed25519 attacks
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- Cuando Ergon `arkhe-noesis-attestation-types` ship Cap 42+, swap encoding canonical SCALE → postcard sin breaking pallet verify call site
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**4 nuevos tests Ed25519 verify real canonical**:
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- `ed25519_verify_real_valid_signature_canonical` — signed attestation real verifies correctly
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- `ed25519_verify_tampered_signature_rejected_canonical` — bit-flipped signature rejected
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- `ed25519_verify_tampered_payload_rejected_canonical` — tampered asset_id mismatch rejected (payload re-encode)
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- `ed25519_zero_signature_fails_verify_canonical` — all-zero signature rejected by verify_strict
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- Helper function `signed_attestation()` canonical para test setup con real SigningKey + sign
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### Lo que SÍ funciona ahora end-to-end (v0.0.16)
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- ✅ PROV-2 storage canonical
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- ✅ PROV-3 dispatchable canonical full flow (6-step)
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- ✅ **PROV-4 Real Ed25519 verify canonical** (NUEVO v0.0.16)
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- ✅ PROV-5 OIT Level >= 3 enforce
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- ✅ PROV-6 is_anchorable check
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- ✅ PROV-7 Events emission
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- ✅ Pallet wired en runtime (Index 7 Provenance)
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- ✅ Real signature verification con tests verde
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### Lo que NO funciona aún (v0.0.17 next slice)
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- ⏳ **PROV-8 Runtime API `verify_provenance`** — sequential next slice
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- ⏳ **Mock runtime integration tests** — para verify dispatchable end-to-end con storage assertions
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- ⏳ **Ergon arkhe-noesis-attestation-types** swap canonical — encoding swap canonical SCALE → postcard cuando sub-crate land
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### Honest disclosure canonical
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Mi `signing_payload()` usa SCALE encoding (parity-scale-codec) en mi vendor copy
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interim Option B. Ergon's real `arkhe-noesis-attestation-types` (Cap 42+) usará
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postcard encoding canonical per Slice 7.0r spec. Esto significa que **mi pallet
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verifica correctamente firmas generadas con MI vendor copy**, pero NO verifica
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firmas canonical reales de Ergon Noesis hasta que swap encoding canonical post
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Cap 42+. El swap canonical es 1-line change canonical en signing_payload() —
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zero impact en pallet verify logic (que es agnostic al encoding del payload).
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Pattern análogo Slice 3 mock-WASM: la lógica real working, el data layer
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canonical swap canonical cuando upstream land. Avanza Phase 2.1 sin bloqueo.
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### Verification end-to-end
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- ✅ `cargo check --workspace --all-targets` verde 1.55s
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- ✅ `cargo test -p origin-chain-provenance --lib` — **6/6 tests pass** (4 nuevos Ed25519 verify real)
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- ✅ NO REGRESSION existing tests workspace
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- ✅ NO REGRESSION runtime + node + chain_spec builder
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### PROV sub-decisions status canonical v0.0.16
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| PROV | Sub-decision | Status v0.0.16 |
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|------|--------------|----------------|
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| PROV-1 | Schema separation Noesis/chain | ✅ |
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| PROV-2 | StorageMap<AssetHash, AssetAttestation> | ✅ wired |
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| PROV-3 | Dispatchable attest_asset | ✅ full flow working |
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| **PROV-4** | **Real Ed25519 verification** | **✅ NUEVO v0.0.16** |
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| PROV-5 | OIT Level >= 3 enforce | ✅ |
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| PROV-6 | is_anchorable check | ✅ |
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| PROV-7 | Events emission | ✅ |
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| PROV-8 | Runtime API verify_provenance | ⏳ v0.0.17 next |
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**6/8 PROV sub-decisions COMPLETE canonical post-v0.0.16**.
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## [0.0.15] — 2026-05-24 — Phase 2.1 PROVENANCE pallet wired en runtime + BoundedVec agent_chain
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**Phase 2.1 v0.0.15** — pallet-origin-provenance wired en runtime composition.
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@@ -3,21 +3,24 @@
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//! Asset attestation pallet canonical per CHN-7 + DC PROVENANCE_PALLET_V1
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//! (5/10 firmas hoy 2026-05-24, deadline ratificación 2026-05-29).
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//!
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//! ## Status canonical: SCAFFOLD v0.0.14 (trait-first foundation pattern)
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//! ## Status canonical: v0.0.16 — Real Ed25519 verification implementada
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//!
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//! Este crate provee la **structural skeleton** del pallet:
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//! - Storage layout canonical `StorageMap<AssetHash, AssetAttestation>` (PROV-2)
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//! - Dispatchable canonical `attest_asset(origin, ValidationAttestation)` (PROV-3)
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//! - Events canonical `AssetAttested` + `AttestationRejected` (PROV-7)
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//! - Errors canonical (PROV-4/5/6)
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//! - Pallet Config trait canonical
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//! Este crate provee:
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//! - Storage layout canonical `StorageMap<AssetHash, AssetAttestation>` (PROV-2) ✅
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//! - Dispatchable canonical `attest_asset(origin, ValidationAttestation)` (PROV-3) ✅
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//! - **Real Ed25519 verify canonical via ed25519-dalek (PROV-4) ✅ v0.0.16**
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//! - OIT Level >= 3 enforcement canonical (PROV-5) ✅
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//! - is_anchorable check canonical (PROV-6) ✅
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//! - Events canonical `AssetAttested` + `AttestationRejected` (PROV-7) ✅
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//! - Errors canonical (PROV-4/5/6) ✅
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//! - Pallet Config trait canonical ✅
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//!
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//! ## Lo que NO funciona aún (real impl post-Ergon sub-crate Cap 42+)
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//! ## Lo que NO funciona aún (post-Ergon sub-crate Cap 42+)
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//!
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//! - Ed25519 verification real canonical (PROV-4) — `todo!()` placeholder
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//! - OIT Level >= 3 enforcement canonical (PROV-5) — preparado pero no live
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//! - is_anchorable check canonical (PROV-6) — preparado pero no live
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//! - Real `ValidationAttestation` consumption — usa vendor copy interim Option B
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//! (signing_payload usa SCALE encoding canonical; Ergon real sub-crate usará
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//! postcard encoding — swap canonical post Cap 42+ sin breaking pallet logic)
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//! - Runtime API canonical `verify_provenance` (PROV-8) — v0.0.17 next slice
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//!
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//! Per Ergon decision (diary `3f773a03` 2026-05-24): él ships
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//! `arkhe-noesis-attestation-types` standalone canonical Cap 42+ (target
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@@ -201,10 +204,31 @@ pub mod pallet {
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Error::<T>::NotAnchorable
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);
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// PROV-4 Ed25519 verification canonical — SCAFFOLD placeholder.
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// Real impl post Ergon Cap 42+ sub-crate. Por ahora skip verify canonical
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// (any caller signed origin can attest — testing canonical only).
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// TODO Phase 2.1 v0.0.16: ed25519_dalek verify canonical aquí.
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// PROV-4 canonical: Real Ed25519 verification via ed25519-dalek (v0.0.16).
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//
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// Pattern canonical:
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// 1. Reconstruct VerifyingKey desde validator_oit.public_key (32 bytes)
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// 2. Reconstruct Signature desde attestation.signature (64 bytes)
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// 3. Compute signing_payload canonical (SCALE encoding interim Option B)
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// 4. verify_strict canonical (rejects malleable signatures + zero-keys)
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//
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// Cuando Ergon arkhe-noesis-attestation-types ship Cap 42+, swap canonical
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// a postcard encoding canonical sin breaking pallet logic — verify call site
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// remains identical canonical.
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let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
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&validation_attestation.validator_oit.public_key,
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)
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.map_err(|_| Error::<T>::InvalidSignature)?;
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let signature = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(
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&validation_attestation.signature,
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);
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let payload = validation_attestation.signing_payload();
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pubkey
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.verify_strict(&payload, &signature)
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.map_err(|_| Error::<T>::InvalidSignature)?;
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// PROV-2 canonical: convert + insert canonical.
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// SCAFFOLD: minimal AssetAttestation construction (without creator/sig
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@@ -236,20 +260,101 @@ extern crate alloc;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
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use origin_chain_types::{OitIdentity, SeverityTier, ValidationAttestation, ValidationVerdict};
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// Compile-time API surface verification canonical (scaffold-level).
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// Real functional tests post v0.0.15 + mock runtime + Ergon sub-crate land.
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// Compile-time + Ed25519 verify standalone tests canonical.
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// Mock runtime integration tests canonical = Phase 2.1 v0.0.17 next slice.
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fn signed_attestation(verdict: ValidationVerdict, severity: SeverityTier) -> ValidationAttestation {
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let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32]);
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let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
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let mut att = ValidationAttestation {
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schema_version: *b"1.0.0 ",
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asset_id: origin_chain_types::AssetHash::new([1u8; 32]),
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validator_oit: OitIdentity {
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public_key: verifying_key.to_bytes(),
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level: 3,
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},
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validated_at_us: 1234567890,
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verdict,
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severity,
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constraints_checked: 42,
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signature: [0u8; 64], // placeholder, replaced post sign
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};
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let payload = att.signing_payload();
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let signature = signing_key.sign(&payload);
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att.signature = signature.to_bytes();
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att
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}
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#[test]
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fn ed25519_verify_real_valid_signature_canonical() {
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// PROV-4 canonical: signed attestation canonical verifies correctamente.
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let att = signed_attestation(ValidationVerdict::Passed, SeverityTier::Info);
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let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
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&att.validator_oit.public_key,
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)
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.expect("valid pubkey canonical");
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let sig = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(&att.signature);
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let payload = att.signing_payload();
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assert!(pubkey.verify_strict(&payload, &sig).is_ok());
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}
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#[test]
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fn ed25519_verify_tampered_signature_rejected_canonical() {
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// PROV-4 canonical: tampered signature canonical rejected.
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let mut att = signed_attestation(ValidationVerdict::Passed, SeverityTier::Info);
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// Flip a bit en signature canonical.
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att.signature[0] ^= 0xFF;
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let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
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&att.validator_oit.public_key,
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)
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.expect("valid pubkey canonical");
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let sig = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(&att.signature);
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let payload = att.signing_payload();
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assert!(pubkey.verify_strict(&payload, &sig).is_err());
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}
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#[test]
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fn ed25519_verify_tampered_payload_rejected_canonical() {
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// PROV-4 canonical: tampered payload canonical (signing_payload mismatch) rejected.
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let mut att = signed_attestation(ValidationVerdict::Passed, SeverityTier::Info);
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let original_sig = att.signature;
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// Flip a bit en asset_id (cambia signing_payload pero mantiene signature original).
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att.asset_id = origin_chain_types::AssetHash::new([99u8; 32]);
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let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
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&att.validator_oit.public_key,
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)
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.expect("valid pubkey canonical");
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let sig = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(&original_sig);
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let payload = att.signing_payload(); // payload canonical NEW (con asset_id tampered)
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assert!(pubkey.verify_strict(&payload, &sig).is_err());
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}
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#[test]
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fn ed25519_zero_signature_fails_verify_canonical() {
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// PROV-4 canonical: all-zero signature canonical rejected por verify_strict.
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// (Note: ed25519-dalek `from_bytes` acepta all-zero pubkey/sig — son
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// valid Edwards points; el rejection canonical pasa en verify_strict.)
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let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32]);
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let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
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let payload = b"any payload canonical";
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let zero_sig = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(&[0u8; 64]);
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assert!(verifying_key.verify_strict(payload, &zero_sig).is_err());
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}
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#[test]
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fn pallet_scaffold_compiles_canonical() {
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// Scaffold compiles — verified by cargo check.
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// Real tests require mock runtime canonical (Phase 2.1 v0.0.15+).
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// Real mock runtime integration tests = Phase 2.1 v0.0.17.
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}
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#[test]
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fn rejection_reason_variants_canonical() {
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// Verify enum variants canonical exist + Marihan refinement included.
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// Use std-only assertion via discriminant.
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let r1 = RejectionReason::InvalidSignature;
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let r2 = RejectionReason::ValidatorTierInsufficient;
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let _r3 = RejectionReason::NotAnchorable;
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